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Canada - U.S. Free Trade and Pressures for Tax Harmonization
Roger II. Cordon
To what degree will dropping trade barriers create pressure on the U.S. and Canada to
harmonize their tax systems? Which aspects of their tax systems will 
be most affected?
Will this harmomzation occur on its own, as each country finds it in its economic interest
to choose tax provisions resembling those in the other country? When will 
explicit coordi-
nation of tax provisions be called for? What pressures towards harmonization 
exist even
with existing trade barriers? Addressing these questions is the objective of this paper.
The answers to these questions depend to some extent on the degree to which the U.S.
aMd Canadian economies are linked. Even when different economics are totally linked, as
are cities and regions in a national economy, these different communities can 
still main-
tain distinct tax rates and even tax structures. There has developed a large 
literature
exploring the characteristics of equilibrium tax structures in this setting, stimulated by
Tiebout(1956). These models assume that everything and everyone is mobile 
- imnplic-
itly, even community boundaries can adjust. The basic conclusion of this literature 
is that
competition among communmities drives the tax system towards one in which each indi-
vidual's or firm's tax payment closely matches the cost of the services received from 
the
conmunnity (or the costs imposed on the community from, e.g., pollution or congestion), a
tax system known in the literature as benefit taxation.) With any other tax structure, de-
cisiuns in one community clearly affect welfare in other communities, creating the potential
for mutually beneficial coordination of fiscal policies.
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Even before the recent free-trade agreement between the U.S. and Canada, these 
two
national economics were closely linked. To begin with, the capital markets were highly
Much of this paper was written while I was visiting the Universidadel Nova de L.isboa. I would like
to thank the other participants in the Canada-U.S. Tax Comparisons project, and 
especially John Shoven
sail Juln Whalley, for comments on a previous draft.
1To the degree to which a community's taxes deviate from benefit taxes, other communities 
have the
itncentiive to hid to attract those individuals or firms who on net pay more than 
they impose in costs on
the communCity. Vor further discussion, see Hluchanan-Coetz(1972).
2 See Corlon(1933) for an exploration of the various possible sources of cxternalities.
integrated, allowing individuals and firms to shift their savings from one country to the
other without restrictions. Trade in goods was substantial. While migration of individuals
does not occur on a large scale, it certainly occurs. The free-trnde agreement will lead
to a further integration of the two economies. To what degree will these economic links
drive the two tax systems towards a benefit-tax structure? What externalities are likely
to remain, creating room for mutually beneficial coordination of fiscal policies?'
To explore this question, the paper proceeds in stages. In section 1, only capital mobility
is allowed for. What implications does this link alone have on domestic tax policies, and
the need for tax harmonization? Section 2 examines what further pressures are created by
free trade in the full range of outputs. Finally, in section 3, labor mobility is allowed for
as well. A brief conclusion ends the paper.
1. Tax implications of capital mobility
This section explores how capital mobility affects the design of tax policy in each of
the two countries. To explore this question, assume for simplicity that only one good is
traded between the two countries. Trade therefore simply takes the form of some of this
good being imported now, in return for an acceptable amount of this good being exlorted
back as return payment int a later period. To shorten the discussion, I will ignore the
implications of risk or inflation.
Without taxes, capital would flow between the two countries until the rate of return
from investing in each country is the same. Let i! represent the rate of return on asset n
in country j. Without taxes and uncertainty, the return on all assets would be equalized
in eqtuilibriun, so that im = it for any asset a in country j and asset b in country k. Civen
this, investors would be indifferent between investing in domestic or foreign cal>ital, and
between investing in different types of financial securities.
Thne equilibrium owvnership structure of securities, and the equilibrium allocation of
capital, can be affected in many ways by the tax systems in the two countries. The
existing tax treatment of capital income is quite complex. To begin with, a corporation's
v hile the paper will often refer to the beneficial coordination of fiscal policies as tax armioizant,this coordination does not necessarily imply equalization of tax rates.
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income is directly subject to tax in the country in which it is located, under the corporate
tax.
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If the owners of a corporation reside in the same country, then they are taxed as
well on the income they receive from this investment under the personal income tax.5 For'
foreign owners of the firm, however, the tax treatment is more complex. Payments may
first be subject to a withholding tax in the source country. If the owner is an individual, the
pre-withholding-tax income is then taxable in the home country, but with a credit for any
withholding tax. If the owner is a corporation, the pre-corporate-tax income underlying
the payments is subject to tax in the home country, but with a credit for any taxes already
paid on this income.' Finally, payouts to the ultimate individual owners are also taxed.
What pressures does capital mobility create, given the existing tax system? To simplify
the discussion, I will initially assume that income from capital is subject to corporate taxa-
tion only in the source country, and that income to individuals from capital is taxable only
in the country where they reside. In effect, this ignores withholding taxes and corporate
surtaxes on repatriated income.' The discussion will start by examining the implications
of capital mobility for residence-based taxes such as the personal income tax, then turn
to source-based taxes, such as the corporate tax. Finally, the discussion will return to
explore the implications of capital mobility for withholding taxes and corporate surtaxes,
and explore the implications of Canada's dividend-credit scheme.
A. Capital taxation under the residence principle
In principle, undera residence-based tax each country taxes the capital income of its
own residents at accrual, regardless of where this income is earned, but does not tax the
income of nonresidents even when they invest in local securities or in local real capital.
. For simplicity, the discussion ignores noncorporate firms.
In Canada, there is a dividend credit, reducing the extent of the double taxation inherent in this tax
structure.
6 In all cases, the credit is not refundable, so is limited to the amount of taxes due in the home country
on that income.
This last assumption may not be that unreasonable. Ilincs-ilubbard(fortlhcomning) provide evidence
that at least U.S. nultinationals pay little or no U.S. taxes on their repatriated carnings.
Let the effective tax rate for residents of country j on income from asset a in country k
be tjk. Then, equilibrium for investors residing in country j requires that il(1 - ti)
it(1 -n.k), while equilibrium for investors residing in country k requires that it(1 -
i(1- r.). As emphasized in Slemrod(1988), these two equilibrium conditions cannot hold
simultaneously unless
L1 t" 1 - il*
1_ (1)
1- tjk 1-kk
. for all assets a and b. Given equation (2), investors will again be indifferent between
investing in any of the available financial securities. Firms would then seek the cheapest
form of financing, given the resulting pre-tax rates of return on different financial securities.
If equation (1) does not hold for all asset pairs, however, then tax arbitrage possibilities
exist enabling investors to rearrange their portfolio holdings to reduce tax payments. Each
investor has the incentive to reduce his holdings of assets that are taxed relatively heavily
in his country and increase his holdings of assets that are taxed relatively lightly. In the
process, investors save on taxes. If investors can own negative amounts of some assets and
can deduct the required payments,' then this rearrangement of portfolios can in principle
continue without limits though risk considerations presumably limit the extent of this
arbitrage.
Of course, similar arbitrage possibilities can arise even in a closed economy.'" In fact,
Gordon-Slemrod(1OSSb) found that in 1983 in the U.S., as a result of such arbitrage, the
attempt to tax the return to savings and investment resulted in a slight net loss in tax
revenue - interest deductions more than offset the taxable income generated by both real
and financial investments. Countries in practice secrn to recognize arbitrage opportunitics
gradually, and then attempt to eliminate them case by case. For example, in the U.S.
individuals are not allowed to deduct interest when they borrow for the purpose of buying
For example, borrowing implies a negative holding of bonds and interest payments are normally de-
ductible.
'echlnically, this requires that each investor be atile to "go short" in at least one asset, deducting the
payments from taxable income, and that each investor be taxed relatively more heavily on the asset lie
goes short in.
10 See Stiglits(1985) for a number of examples.
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a tax-exempt bond. But this is just an example of a wide variety of possible forms of
tax arbitrage, and enforcement of even this restriction is very difficult. Under the 1986
tax reform in the U.S., a broader attempt was made to limit arbitrage possibilities by
restricting interest deductions, except for businesses, and restricting taxpayers' ability to
deduct losses more generally." When this arbitrage takes place across borders, detecting
and dealing with it is that much more difficult.
If investors in each country can "go short" in the appropriate asset, then capital-income
taxation collects significant revenue only if these arbitrage possibilitics are closed off, which
requires that equation (1) be satisfied for all pairs of assets. An agreement between the two
countries on relative tax rates could occur implicitly as well as explicitly. Neither country
would want to deviate from a common set of relative tax rates, since doing so would open
up arbitrage opportunities for investors in both countries - any set of relative tax rates
would be a Nash equilibrirun. However, both countries may gain by jointly agreeing on
a particular set of relative tax rates. The normal presumption has been that a "neutral"
tax system, under which income from all assets is t'axed at the same rate, is the most
attractive.
If no deductions are allowed for payments on debt or other "short" positions, then
a country would never lose revenue from taxing capital income, even without agreeing
with the other country on the relative tax rates on different assets. Equilibrium portfolio
holdings in each country would still depend on the tax policies in both countries, however,
making welfare in the two countries interdependent. Coordination of relative tax rates
would still in principle be justified. However, as shown formally in Gordon(1986), each
country acting in isolation would have the incentive to set its tax rates so that its residents
invest in the security paying the largest amount pre-tax. This is accomplished simply by
equating the tax rates on all assets, so that tll= i , regardless of the tax policy chosen
in the other country. Therefore, a "neutral" tax system may well be the Nash equilibrium
as well as the optimal policy chosen after full coordination.
One apparent response has been an increase in corporate borrowing, since corporate interest deductions
are still allowed.
Given any agreement on relative tax rates on different assets, each country could then
choose independently the absolute level of its tax rates without opening up arbitrage
opportunities. Each country's policies affect the welfare in the other country only through
any resulting changes in the market interest rate. If each country is small relative to the
world capital market, then these changes will be small, implying no important externalities
when choosing the absolute level of residence-based capital income tax rates. The U.S.,
however, is not plausibly small relative to the world capital market - it has the incentive
to reduce its borrowing from foreigners in order to reduce the market interest rate, thereby
reducing the interest payments on its existing debt. Given that Canada is a net debtor in
the world capital market, a reduction in the market interest rate would be beneficial for
Canada, a benefit ignored by the U.S. in designing its own policies.'
2 In particular, under
optimal policies the U.S. would be indifferent to borrowing yet less, but Canada would
gain from the resulting fall in the interest rate. This creates the potential for mutually
beneficial agreements on tax policy.
Use of a residence principle for capital income taxation leads to a major problem with
tax enforcement, however. Within a country, firms and institutions which pay dividends
and interest can be required to report the names of the recipients, and how much they
receive, to the local tax authorities. A country has no direct way to require foreign firms
and institutions to make such reports. But if the tax authority receives no information
directly about the capital income received by its residents from foreign sources, then it will
find it extremely difficult to enforce the taxes due on this income. Reporting income from
assets owned abroad in effect becomes voluntary, and normally investors do not knowingly
make voluntary tax payments. If in practice savings invested abroad is tax free, then all
savings becomes tax free - investors can invest through a foreign financial intermediary
in all assets, including domestic assets. In fact, they may be able to borrow domestically,
deduct the interest, then invest the funds abroad tax free.
2 Changes in the market interest rate have further effects on efficiency to the degree to which choices were
not efmcient initially due to distorting taxes. In particular, if income from saviings were taxed, thent any
resulting decrease in savings reduces welfare. A change in the market interest rate also has dlistributional
consequences which may be of concern to the govenunent.
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Can this enforcement problem be solved through suitable cooperation between the
two countries? Several approaches might be suggcstcd. The two countrics could, for
cxamplc, agrec to share information provided by firms and institutions regarding the names
of recipients of capital income. Another alternative would be a joint agreement that
investments by foreign residents be channeled through foreign financial intermediaries.
The financial intermeilarics in a country would then have information about the world-
wide invcstments made by local residents, which they could then be rcquired to report to
the local tax authoritics.
Any such agreement would allow each country to tax the capital income of its residents,
so would appear to be mutually beneficial. However, given the disparity in the sizes of
the two countries, Canada may have the inscentive to refuse to cooperate. Without the
agreement, the relatively huge number of U.S. investors could flock to Canada hoping
thereby to evade U.S. taxes. The resulting gains to the Canadian economy, whethcr or not
the gains are taxed, may well more than offset the losses to Canada from not being able
to tax the capital income of Canadian residents. If so, the U.S. would need to compensate
Canada in order to secure any such agreement.
Any such agreement would be futile in any case, given that any third country, e.g.
Switzerland, can agree to facilitate the tax evasion of U.S. or Canadian investors. Such
a country could open its own financial intermediaries to foreign depositors, and refuse to
share information with; other countrics. The income to foreign investors working through
these financial intermediaries would again be tax cxCmpt in practice. This small country
can tax away some of the gain to investors from giving them a tax exempt outlet for their
savings, and still attract funds." By refusing to cooperate with other countries, it may not
be able to tax the capital income of its own residents, but if the country is small enough
that would be a minor consideration.
4
13 Conpetition hetween these countries would drive any tax down to zero, however.
1.1 See below, however, for a discussion of use of source-based taxes to help cnforce residence-based taxrs.
Tazation at Repatriation
Even if a country cannot independently detect capital income earned abroad by its
residents, it may be able to detect income as it is repatriated through monitoring all
deposits in domestic financial intermediaries, or through auditing of individuals whose
expenditures clearly exceed their cash flow. What happens if a country simply taxes
capital income at repatriation. If repatriated income is taxed at the same rate, regardless
of the date of repatriation, then the present value of tax payments is the same regardless
of the repatriation date, discounting at the rate of return carned abroad.'
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The tax on the
return to savings becomes instead a one time fec to investing abroad. Iepeated movements
of funds back and forth are therefore discouraged. Ilowever, economic repatriation may be
possible without triggering the repatriation tax. For example, the investor may be able to
borrow at home, possibly using the foreign assets as collateral. The borrowed funds can be
use(l to finance any desired expenditures at home, and in fact lead to further tax savings
through interest deductions. The U.S. tax law has evolved over time, trying to close off
such devices for avoiding the repatriation tax, but doing so is very difficult. If repatriation
can in fact be postponed indefinitely, then savings would remain effectively untaxed.
B. Capital taxation under the source principle
Under a source-based tax, each country would tax the return to real capital located within
its borders, with rates perhaps varying by type of real capital." If in country j the returns
to asset o are taxed at rate t, then in equilibrium i(1 - C) = .(1 - t) for all assets a
and b. Since this condition is the same for investors in each country, allowing for capital
mobility does not create additional complications when characterizing the equilibrium.
What can be said about the optimal source-based capital income tax rate? Diamond-
Mirrlees(1972) argued that when all excise taxes can be used flexibly, and when there are
no pure profits, then the optimal tax system will lead to efficient production. In particular,
if a country is a price taker in the world capital market, then efficient production meanms
1 IIartman(o1985) cmphasized this point.
16 Tax ratcs might also depend on the form of the financial claim to tie real capital income.
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that investment occurs until the marginal rate of return equals that prevailing on the
world market. Thterefdre, in such a setting, the optimal source-based capital income tax
rate should be zero. The intuition underlying this result is very simple: In a small open
economy, a source-based tax on capital cannot be borne by capital, since capital-owners
will not invest in the country unless they earn the same return as they earn elsewhere.
Therefore, the tax ultimately must be paid by immobile factors, presumably land and
labor. But in that case, a direct tax on these factors would dominate, since it would have
the same incidence yet not distort the international flow of capital.
What if firms can earn a rate of return above the world rate? Within a closed economy,
a tax on pure profits, as occurs under a cash-flow tax, does not distort allocations, so is
attractive on efliciency grounds.'
7 
In an open economy, however, pure profits may also be
mobile. For example, if the profits are tied to technology rather than location, then the
firm will locate production based on economic conditions in the available countries. An
open economy would then be able to extract rents from the firm only to the extent to which
the country provides locational advantages greater than exist elsewhere. A small country
presutmably provides at best small advantages, implying based on the same reasoning as
before that the optimal tax on these pure profits is close to zero.
18
The Diamond-Mirrlces argument also implies, however, that a large open economy
will wish to equate the domestic marginal product of capital to the marginal cost to the
country of extra funds on the world market. As a result, a country such as the U.S.
which is large relative to the world capital market has the incentive to take advantage
of this market power by restricting net capital flows. Civen that the U.S. has recently
been a net borrower in the world capital market, this would imply taxing investment in
order to reduce net borrowing. Before the 1OSO's, when the U.S. was a capital exporter,
the incentives would instead have been to subsidize investment to restrict capital exports.
Canada does not plausibly have market power in the world capital markets, so should not
1 See, for example, Mirrlees(1972).
18 If the profits arise from control of a patent, tlen the patent right itself can be relocated] to a tax-free
country, and the pure profits paid in the form of a tax-deductible license fee to this country, witl (no
change in the location of production.
attempt to change investment incentives.9
What about the evidence in Feldstein-Horioka(i9SO) that savings and investment rates
in OECD countries are highly correlated, suggesting only limited capital mobility? This
evidence may well be consistent with all countries having market power, leading them to
wish to restrict net capital flows. For example, if the goods produced in different comun-
tries are not perfect substitutes, then borrowing from abroad could involve substituting
foreign-produced for domestically-produced consumption goods to free resources for new
investment. The debt is repaid by exporting domestically-produced consumption goods in
the future. But the shifting relative demands for domestic and foreign outpumt can change
relative prices, in effect changing the time path of the exchange rate, creating incentives
to reduce the extent of capital-account imbalances.20
Except as a means to take advantage of monopoly power, are there any other ways of
explaining the continued though relatively minor role of corporate taxes in the U.S. and
Canada? One traditional rationalization for the corporate income tax is that it is neces-
sary to prevent wholesale avoidance of a residence-based tax on equity income, given the
favorable treatment of accruing capital gains under existing tax systems. This argument is
appropriate only in a closed economy, however, where domestic shareholders can be taxed
indirectly on their accruing capital gains through imposing a corporate tax on domestic
corporations. In a small open economy, the rate of return earned by domestic residents
on their savings, before personal taxes, is set by the world market so is unchanged by a
domestic source-based tax.
A related argument is that the corporate tax prevents avoidance of the domestic
tax on labor income, at least in closely-held corporations. Without the corporate tax,
shareholder-employees in such firms have the incentive to leave their labor earnings in the
firm, thereby allowing their shares to increase in value. When they need cash, they can
simply sell some of their shares in the firm, paying tax on the accumulated gains at the
more favorable capital-gains rate. A cash-flow tax on corporate income at the same rate
is See Cordon-Varian(1989), however, for an argument that even small countries may have market power
with respect to equity issued ini their country, due to its idiosyncratic risk.
20 See Cordon(1988a) for further discussion.
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as the labor-inacomean tax rate woulde liminate this opportunity, though it might discourage
fins earning pure profits from locating in the country. A better alternative, at least in
theory, would be to shift from a labor income tax to a consumption tax. Given tlhc ap-
propriate treatment of bequests, both have the same lifetime incidence, but consumption
may be casier to ncasurc.
Certainly if a firmt imposes costs on the public sector through use of public services and
facilities, then uiser fees would be appropriate, even in the Diamond-Mirrlecs setting. It is
difficult to justify a tax on capital income based on this reasoning, however.
These argumncnts together suggest that at least a small open economy should not make
use of source-based capital-income taxes. However, source-based capital-income taxation
in onc country imposes clear externalitics on other countries, suggesting that countries
may gain by jointly agreeing to use source-based taxes. In particular, when one country
raises its source-based capital-income tax, capital flows to other countries raising wage
rates in tlhcsc other countrics and raising tax revcnucs if thcsc countries also use source-
based capital-income taxes. In fact, a uniform capital-income tax at source is equivalent
to a uniform tax based on residence. While a residence-based tax is very difficult to
enforce, given the goverunent's lack of independent information about capital income
carned abroad by its residents, enforccmncaut of a source-based tax in theory should be
muich easier since any activity within the country can be monitored by the tax authorities.
Therefore, countries may well find it attractive to jointly tax capital income at source as
a means of taxing inidirectly the capital income carned by their residents." The U.S. and
Canada together, however, arc not much larger relative to the world capital market than
the U.S. alone, suggesting that the room for Parcto-improving gains between thesc two
countrics alone may be Uite limited.
Furtherimore, source-based taxation at least of multinational firms has its own enforce-
ment problems. There are many ways in which a multinational can shift accounting profits
towards the country which has the lowest statutory tax rate, even without changing the
21 Sec Giovannini-ilines(1050) fora discussion of how transfers might be mnde bctwccn govcrnments so
that the allocation of revene among countries would be equivalent to that arising under A residence-based
lax.
location of real activity. The easiest approadi is probably through manipulation of the
transfer prices assigned to goods and services moving between firms within the maultina-
tional. Similarly, the multinational can locate patents for new technology in the country
withL the lowest tax rate. Yet another approach is to do the bulk of the debt financing for
the multinational in the country with the highest tax rate, using perhaps as collateral the
assets located in other countries. Governments have little ability to monitor the divcIsc
nature of transactions within a firm, and can effectively challenge only a small fraction of
these schemes.
Given that mudtinationals can quickly and casily shift taxable income towards those
countries with the lowest statutory tax rate, each country has a strong incentive to cut
its statutory tax rate in order to benefit from this process. Tax competition then drives
statutory tax rates towards zero even if the location of real activity is not very sensitive
to relative tax rates.
The above discussion of optimal tax policy assumes that capital is fully mobile in
response to differences in rates of return. Once capital is invested in a country, however,
it is diflicult to move even in response to high tax rates. Therefore, while the amount of
new investment may be very sensitive to tax rates, the amount of existing capital may be
virtually fixed. As a result, at any date a country has an incentive to seize any existing
capital but then to promise never to do this again, so as not to discourage new investmcnt."
Asuning it can make such a binding promise, then by the above arguments it would choose
never to tax new investment. Dut governments have no way to preconunit their future tax
policy. If no commitment has been made, then once new investment occurs and the capital
has become immobile, the country again has the incentive to seize it. This is known as the
"time consistency" problem. Perhaps, reputation effects inhibit even the initial seizure of
capital. Alternatively, the country can subsidize initial investments to compensate for the
taxes that inevitably will be collected from this investment at a later date, regardless of
what may be promised.
22 'hc saime incentives can cxist even with taxation based on residence. For example, if foreigners have
large holdings of domestically issued bonds, then A government has the incentive to unexpectedly inflate
the currency, thereby wiping out its debt to foreigners.
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C. Capital income taxation under the current law
So far, we have ignored the incentivcs created by existing tax treatics. Givcn these treaties,
how does the forecasted behavior of each government change? What joint tax structure
would be forecasted to arise? Comparing this tax structure with that which arises without
these tax trcatics, docs cach country plausibly gain from signing the tad treaties? Existing
tax treatics affect the taxation in the home country of both portfolio income carned abroad
by domestic investors and corporate income repatriated from foreign subsidiaries by a
domestically-based multinational. In each case, the home country allows a tax credit for
particular taxes paid abroad, whereas our previous discussion assumed that foreign tax
payments were deductible.
One further complication ignored in the previous discussion was the use of a dividend-
credit scheme in Canada. The incentives created by this scheme are complicated enough
that they merit a separate discussion.
Withholding tazeJ on portfolio income
Let us begin by examining the equilibrium use of withholding taxes on portfolio income
earned by foreign investors. Existing tax treaties require a tax credit in the home country
for withholding taxes paid on portfolio income accruing in the host country, with a inaxi-
mum credit equal to the taxes due on the income in the home country. If the treaties did
not also specify the rate of withholding tax, how would each country respond?
Assume first that tax evasion is not a problem, so that each country can effectively
tax income earned by domestic residents from foreign portfolio holdings. Consider first
the incentives faced by a small host country. Since a withholding tax does not affect
the net-of-tax earnings of foreign investors, as long as the withholding tax rate remains
below the domestic tax rate faced by'these foreign investors on their portfolio income,
the tax produces revenue without any loss to domestic residents. Therefore, the host
country should choose to raise this tax rate at least up to the foreign tax rate.23 If the
23 vith a diversity of roreig,, tax rates, the story becomes a bit more complicated, since the country is
no longer a price-taker in the world capital market.
tax rate is raised further, however, it does discourage capital inflows, and the Diamond-
Mirrlecs reasoning still implies that a small open economy would not choose to impose
such distortions.
24
How would the home government behave, given this foreign withholding tax rate? In
ongoing work with Vitor Gaspar, I have shown under standard assumptions that the home
country would never choose a tax rate on the portfolio income of domestic residents equal
to this foreign withholding tax rate - the optimal tax rate could in principle be either
lower or higher.
2" When the tax rate is below this point, raising the tax rate affects
the net-of-tax rate of return only of domestic investments, so quickly drives investments
abroad. When the tax rate is above this point, however, a tax increase affects foreign and
domestic holdings equally, making tax increases just above the foreign rate more attractive
than tax increases just below the foreign rate. This implies, at least in theory, that there
is no Nash equilibrium set of tax rates.
\Vithout tax evasion as a problem, I argued above that residence-based taxes should
create few externalities, implying little gain from coordination. Therefore, even if the treaty
led to a clear outcome, it would be very unlikely that this outcome would be preferred by
both countries to the situation without the treaty.
What if investors can easily evade domestic taxes by investing through foreign financial
intermediaries? Then, domestic investors can always avoid tax by investing abroad, so a
withholding tax is simply a source-based tax, and by the same arguments used above we
conclude that a small open economy should not impose a source-based tax.
Why then do countries impose withholding taxes? One possible explanation is that
each country's equity is a unique asset, if only because it provides risk-diversification not
available elsewhere. In that case, each country would have the incentive to take advantage
of its monopoly power by, for example, imposing a withholding tax on payments to foreign
equity-holders.
26 
What if those paying this tax include domestic investors buying through
21 As noted before, a large open economy would set its taxes to take advantage of this market power.
25 liond-Samruelson(1988) find, under different assumptions which allow each country to tax domestic
and foreign income at different rates, that equilibrium tax rates will be high enough to cut off any capital
flow.
26 For further discussion, see Gordon-Varian(1989).
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a foreign intermediary to evade domestic taxes? Imposing a withholding tax remains
attractive as long as taxing capital income would be part of the desired tax system."
If the only motivation towards imposing withholding taxes is to take advantage of mar-
ket power, then there would be a joint efficiency gain from reducing these trade distortions
by jointly setting a low ceiling for withholding tax rates. Since Canada would presumably
gain more, given the much greater market power of the U.S., such an agreement may in
practice require Canadian concessions on other trade issues.
28
Why would any withholding tax be allowed by such a treaty? One possible explanation
is the following: If domestic investors find use of foreign intermediaries more expensive,
then the case of tax evasion results in an efficiency loss through use of more expensive
intermediaries. A withholding tax can induce domestic investors to invest instead through
domestic interinediaies and pay the residence-based tax, resulting in an efficiency gain
through the reduced cost of financial intermediation.
Corporate tazation of repatriated earnings
Previously, I argued that source-based tax rates would be at or near zero in a Nash
eqtdlbrirun. llow do existing tax treaties dealing with repatriated corporate earnings
change the equilibrium behavior of the two governments? Let us ignore initially the effects
of taxation at repatriation rather than at accrual and assume that all capital flows are
direct invcstments by multinational corporations.
Under the provisions of the tax treaty, a source-based tax assessed just on foreign direct
investment does not affect investment incentives as long as the source-based tax rate is
below the corporate tax rate in the multinational's home country. Therefore, cacht country
27 The witllolling tax also reduces the incentive to use foreign financial intermediaries, leading to
potential efficiency gains if domestic intermediaries are more efficient at hanidling domestic investments.
28 Such an agreement could require coordination of withholding tax rates with respect to third countries.
Otherwise, the optimal Canadian withholding tax rates toward third countries would presumably he low,
given the limits on its market power. As a result, third parties could then purchase U.S. equity through
Canadian financial intermediaries, paying two rounds of low withholding tax rates as the funds travelled
from the U.S. to Canada and then to the third country, rather than paying the higher U.S. withholding
tax rate that applies to that third country.
has the incentive to set its source-based corporate tax rate on foreign direct investment
equal to the corporate tax rate prevailing in the other country.
The incentives faced by the host country do not end here, however. Since a multina-
tional pays the same tax rate, regardless of the location of an investment, the before--tax
rate of return on investments in the two countries would be equated. however, when one
country acquires funds from the other country, it pays the net-of-tax rate of return on
these funds, as a result of the source-based taxes. A small open economy would therefore
want to equate the value of the marginal product of capital with this net-of-tax rate of
return paid for funds acquired from abroad, or earned on funds invested abroad. In order
to induce firms to equate the marginal product of capital with the net-of-tax cost of fuinds,
the government could provide a suitable direct subsidy to new investment." This subsidy
produces the desired result as long as it is treated as extra income rather than a reduction
in the creditable tax payment uinder the tax treaty.
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What are the incentives faced by the home country? The Diamond-Mirrlces results
still show that the home country wants to set the marginal product of domestic investment
equal to the cost of funds on the world market. For a small open economy, this still requires
that no taxes be collected on foreign earnings, so requires that the domestic tax rate be at
or below the foreign tax rate.
2 1
Civen that multinationals are based in both countries, cach country is bothi a hiomte
country and a host country for some investment. If the same corporate tax rate applies to
both, then the combined incentive is to set the corporate rate equal to the rate prevailing
in the other country. Any common corporate tax rate could be a Nash equilibrium. If
one country, e.g. the U.S., acts as it Stackelberg leader, then it can choose the common
corporate tax rate. What rate would it choose? Given that the countries together are net
borrowers in the world capital market, it woul want a positive corporate tax rate to take
29 The apupropriate subsidy rate would he if'/(I - t). where I is the residence-based tax rate, and I' is
the marginal product of capital.
30 For further discussion, sec Findlay(l986).
For simpuutlicity, this assumes that the definition of taxable income is tie sane is the two countries. For
a liscussion of comnplicationss which arise when this is not the case, see I.cechor-Alintz(1900).
advantage of the combined market power of the U.S. and Canada. The tax treaty therefore
should lead to greater use of source-based taxes than would occur without the tax treaty.
Since the U.S. would presumably'not take into account Canadian preferences concerning
the overall level of corporate tax rates when setting its corporate tax rate, there may still
be gains from direct coordination of tax rates.
How do the results change if we take into account that investments made through a
foreign subsidiary are taxed only at repatriation rather than at accrual? As Jun(19S7)
shows, postponeimenit of realization drives the effective tax rate on the initial equity in-
vcstment down towards (and in the limit equal to) the tax rate in the host country, while
llnrtmnu(19S5) argues that for investments financed by retained earnings, the effective tax
rate is simply the host-country tax rate. But if the effective tax rate is the host country
tax rate, then a smidl open host country would not choose to impose such a tax.
What happens if capital flows to foreign firms can take the form of portfolio investments
rather than just direct investment by foreign subsidiaries? Funds can flow from the home
country to the host country either by direct investment by a multinational, which itself is
owned by home-country individuals, or else by purchase of equity in host-country firms by
home-country individuals. In either case, the same host-country corporate taxes are paid,
and home-country individuals owe tax at the same rate on the net income they receive."]
The key difference is that with direct investment by a multinational, supplementary taxes
might be owed to the home country. If so, portfolio investment is preferred for tax reasons.
If there are no nontax reasons favoring direct investment, then supplementary taxes would
never be paid at repatriation, and a small open host country would therefore not impose
a source-based tax.
Dividend-credit Jchecrn
What incentives are created by the presence of the dividend-credit scheme in Canada?
Most of the discussion of the effects of such a scheme assume a closed economy. But as
Doadwmay-Druce(19S9) emphasize, the effects of the scheme are very different in an open
32 This ignores the dividend-credit scheme available in Canada for income from domestic corporations.
Sce below for further discmssion.
economy. For simplicity, assume that the scheme provides full integration of the corporate
and personal tax systems, and assume to begin with that the Canadian corporate tax rate
is below the U.S. corporate rate.
When Canadian corporations invest in the U.S., they must pay U.S. corporate taxes on
their foreign earnings. When the earnings are repatriated, no corporate surtax is due, but
shareholders still receive a dividend credit based on the difference between their personal
tax rate and the Canadian corporate tax rate. If the corporate tax rate exceeds the
personal tax rate, then on net Canada provides a subsidy for direct investment by Canadian
multinationals in the U.S., and thereby raises the return to savings in Canada above the
return available in the world market." This subsidy is not available when Canadian
individuals buy shares in U.S. corporations, so this scheme favors direct investment over
portfolio investment.
How does its presence affect the equilibrium corporate tax rates? As a home country,
when Canada raises its corporate tax rate it increases the subsidy it gives to investments
by Canadian investors in the U.S. The Diamond-Mirrlecs result still implies that Canada
would want to equate the marginal product of capital in Canada with the rate of return
available on the world market. To do so now requires that the corporate tax rate be zero.
As a host country, however, Canada wotdd still wish to set its corporate tax rate equal to
the U.S. rate. Therefore, on net Canada would prefer a tax rate below the U.S. rate.
The U.S., as Stackelberg leader, would now have to take into account that Canada
will keep its corporate tax rate below that in the U.S. This certainly affects the optimal
tax rate in the U.S., and implies that capital will not be allocated efficiently between
the two countries in equilibrium. As a result, there would be a further gain from direct
coordination of tax rates.
Specifically, under the dividend-crclit scheme, shareholders receiving a dollar of dividends are credited
with earning 1/(1 - r,) in pre-corporate tax profits, where rc is the corporate tax rate. On this income,
they owe personal taxes at rate te, but receive a credit for corporate taxes already paid, implying a net
tax liability of (IC - rT)/(1 - i). By assumption, te < re. If income Y is repatriated from foreign earnings
and generates no corporate surtax at repatriation, then net tax payments in Canada on these earnings arc
(e - r,)/(1 - rc)Y < 0, implying a subsidy to foreign investment.
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2. Tax policy given free trade
Based on recent agreements, all tariffs and most nontariff barricrs to trade between the
U.S. and Canada will be eliminated by 1008. What implications will this policy change
have for the domestic tax structure in each country?
Assume to begin with that each country is free to use tariffs, but that trade is not
otherwise restricted. As noted above, Diamond-Mirrlecs(1971) showed that a small open
economy which imposes excise taxes on all goods would choose to produce eficiently under
an optimal tax system. This implies that it would choose not to distort trade patterns. As
emphasized in Cordon-Levinsohin(forthcoming), however, this does not necessarily imply
that a country would avoid use of tariffs. In particular, the effects of an excise tax on
a particular good can be duplicated by a production tax and an import tariff or export
subsidy on that good. It may be that it is easier to administer a combination of a tariff
andi a production tax, at equal rates, on some goods than to administer an excise tax on
these goods. Both have the same economic effects, and neither distorts trade patterns.'
To the degree that tax or other policies distort relative output prices, then optimal policy
would involve undoing these distortions at the border through suitable export taxes and
subsidies.
Of course, if a country does have market power in a particular good, then it will want
to take advantage of this market power, as shown in the optimal tariff literature. However,
doing so does not require use of explicit tariffs, since again the combination of a production
tax and a consumption subsidy have the same effects.
One of the main source-based taxes in the U.S. and Canada is the corporate income tax.
This tax raises the prices of corporate relative to noncorporate goods, and alters relative
corporate prices due to differences in capital-output ratios and due to idiosyncracics in
depreciation and other detailed provisions in the tax law. Under optimal tariff policy in a
small country, these distortions would be offset at the border.
Domestic regulations may also distort relative prices, creating the incentive to use
tariffs to offset these distortions. For example, agricultural price supports lead food prices
3 Trade distortions are present in this argument when the tax law favors purchases of goods produced
insa particular location.
to differ from marginal costs, justifying export subsidies on these products. Similarly,
the U.S. lumber industry may face a below-market price for use of the National Forests,
leading lumber prices to be below marginal costs and thereby justifying export taxes.
The Canadian sales tax also creates nontrivial distortions to the relative prices of
imported vs. domestically produced goods, as reported in Dodge-Sargent(19S7). Since it
is imposed at the wholesale rather than the retail level, the amount of tax collected on a
finished product depends on the number of transactions tit occur between firms at the
wholesale stage. To some degree, industries can change how they organize their production
in order to minimize the total sales tax payments that are incurred, but doing so has its
own costs.
What will be the implications for source-based taxes, and regulatory distortions, of the
free trade agreement between the U.S. and Canada? This agreement will have no economic
effect if each country can costlessly offset this change through a suitable modification to its
domestic tax structure as it applies specifically to income flows between the two countries.
To compensate for the drop in tariff or nontariff barriers for a particular good, each country
could compensate by cutting the domestic tax (increasing the subsidy) on )rodluctiion of
that good and increasing the sales tax rate on consumption of that good. To avoid any
economic changes, tariffs between the U.S. or Canada and third countries would riced to
be suitably readjusted.
These compensating readjustments in the domestic tax system, to neutralize the effects
of the free-trade agreement between the U.S. and Canada, are substantial and awkward. If
they cannot be dlone, then source-based taxes on production will become more costly from
each country's perspective, since the resulting distortions to the trade pattern between
the U.S. and Canada can no longer be neutralized by suitable border distortions. Civen
the large volume of trade between the two countries, these distortions will be hnuiportanut,
creating significant pressure to cut distortions to the relative prices of diffcrenit goods to
maintain an efricient composition of trade. Similarly, rcgtulations which distort relative
output prices become much more costly.
Various responses to these pressures are possible. For one, policy distortions to the
relative prices of domestic output can be reduced by "leveling the playing field" by elimi-
nating differences in the effective tax rates on different industries. If the tax system raises
the prices of all domestically produced goods by the same percent, then the exchange
rate between the Canadian and the U.S. dollar would simply readjust, leaving trading
incentives unchanged. Such a shift in the tax system in each country has been occurring
recently in any case, whether or not connected to the U.S.-Canada frcc-trade agreement.
To the extent that regulations create price distortions, e.g. various agricultural programs
designed to raise crop prices artificially, then each country would face competitive pressure
to redesign these regulations to "level the playing field" between these sectors and other
domestic industries.
From the perspective of the two countries together, however, as long as any particular
industry is equally favored or disfavored by the tax/regulatory system in both countries,
no policy distortion to trade patterns is created. In some cases, harmonizing the relative
tax rates on different industries in the two countries may be easier or more desirable than
allowing competitive pressures to undermine rate differences across industries which each
country might in principle have desired.
Coordination between the two countries can also affect the size of tariff barriers with
respect to the rest of the world. Together the two countries have more market power than
either country has in isolation, particularly in goods such as lumber or wheat. Coordination
would therefore lead to increased restrictions on their combined trade with the rest of the
world.
Coordination of policies between the two countries, whether concerning policies with
respect to each other or with respect to the rest of the world, does not require a written
treaty. Any country which deviates from an implicit agreement could incur "punishment'
from the other country in some form. As long as the threat of "punishment" is a sufficient
deterrent, the implicit agreement will be sustainable.
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This use of threats to enforce an
implicit agreement is commonly seen with regard to tariff policy, and may well occur with
regard to tax policy as well. 36
S cThere is a large literature in cooperative game theory on Lie sustainability of such a cooperative
outcomne.
36 Since tarifTs can be duplicated through use of a suitable set of domnestic taxes, the two policy areas are
not really distinct in any case.
3. Tax policy given mobility of individuals
So far, the discussion has ignored tax/expenditure pressures created by the movement
of individuals across borders. Yet travel between the two countries is extensive, taking
the form of tourism and business trips as well as changes in the location of employmnent
or even of citizenship. The U.S.-Canada free-trade agreement reduces some restrictions
on the movement of individuals across the border. What pressures are created by such
movement of individuals?
This is in many ways the key question examined in the local public-finance literature.
As argued by Duchanan-Coetz(1972) and many others, mobility of individuals imposes
externalities on jurisdictions which depend on the degree to which the individual pays an
amount in taxes which differs from the costs that individual imposes on the jurisdiction,
whether in the form of increased costs of public services or increased congestion. This
applies in both the sending and the receiving jurisdiction. V/hen a community gains on net
from the presence of an individual, because tax payments exceed the costs that individual
imposes on the community, the community has an incentive to encourage inmigration,
and conversely. This competitive pressure pushes the tax system towards a ibenefit-tax
structure im which the net gain to the jurisdiction from acquiring/losing an extra individual
is competed down to zero. At that point, individuals simply pay for the costs they impose
on the community.
What implications does this story have for tax policy at the national level? Consider
first the pressures created by temporary migration, such as tourism. Through such mi-
gration, countries trade in services as well as in goods." Therefore, tax and regulatory
policies can potentially distort the relative trade in services vs. goods, as well is distort
the composition of trade in goods which physically cross the border. Countries would face
competitive pressure to reduce or eliminate policy-distortions to the composition of trade,
which now includes services as well as "tradeables."
When individuals cross the border, however, they also normally increase the costs of
pubic services, since they make muse of roads, police protection, etc. A country would want
Migration is not even nceded for trade in financial scrviccs.
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to encourage nmigration if tax payments exceed the net costs imposed by inmigration,
and conversely. By the Diamnond-Mirrlccs reasoning, a small open economy would simply
charge for the services obtained, whether directly or indirectly, and so would design tax
policy to increase the cost of goods used by migrants above the cost of goods that are
physically exported -- the playing field would be intentionally "tilted" to compensate for
the costs imposed on the public sector when certain goods are purchased. Countries with
relative market power in, e.g., tourist-related services, would attempt to charge yet more
to take advantage of this market power.
Individuals who change their country of employment create more extensive changes in
the tax revenue and public-service costs in each country. Presumably, the relocation of
higher paid individuals creates larger relative gains, since their tax payments are relatively
large compared to the cost of the public services they require. Similarly, each country has
an incentive to discourage the inmigration of those who impose net fiscal costs, be they
the poor, the sick, or the elderly.
Competition for individuals who provide a net fiscal gain to the jurisdiction therefore
reduces the degrcc to which the fscal system redistributes from rich to poor, again push-
ing towards a benefit-tax system. But the resulting tax structure cannot simply equate
benefits and tax payments in present value over the lifetime, since individuals can remain
in the country when they gain on net, and leave during those periods when they lose on
net. Therefore, even thIe liming of taxes would he pushed to coincide with the timing of
benefits. As a result, national debt would be discouraged since it creates the incentive to
emigrate during those periods when the debt is repaid. Similarly, redistributive policies
such as Social Security would come under pressure since those who work for a short pc-
riodt under existing law gain substantially from the system. Since nonworkers do not pay
labor income taxes but do make use of public services, and often more extensively than do
workers, even labor income taxes may not easily be sustainable. A country which relics
heavily on a labor-income tax would become a haven for nonworkers, such as students
or tIe retired. Public services such as subsidized college education or free medical care




All of these are examples of pressures towards a benefit-tax structure. Which tax
system most resembles a benefit tax depends on the composition of public expenditures.
If consumption of public services roughly corresponds with consumption of private goods,
then a consumption tax or a V.A.T. may most closely approximate a benefit tax. User
fees certainly approximate a benefit tax.
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This evolution towards a benefit-tax structure would occur even if both countries desire
a redistributive fiscal policy. Based on this reasoning, the conventional wisdom in public
finance has always been that redistribution should be done at the national rather than at
the local level. Retranslated to this context, the analysis suggests that policies regarding
redistribution should be coordinated between the two countries. Of course, coordination
must cover both tax and expenditure policies, otherwise each country can make use of its
remaining flexibility to attract those who pay more than they receive.
The Ticbout lieterature argues, however, that expendlitures financed by benefit taxes
should not need coordination4" - competition among jurisdictions pushes them to offer
the efficient composition and level of public services. How can jurisdictions choose the
composition and level of services financed by benefit taxes without coordination, however,
and yet agree to restrictions on their expenditure policies to prevent undermining of in-
terjurisdictional agreements on redistribution? In a Federal system, these contradictory
pressures are avoided by having redistribution (lone at the national level. Competition
among communities then leads to a local benefit-tax structure, in which case there is no
fiscal gain to a community from attracting those who pay relatively more to the national
government. Without this Federal structure, however, coordination of at least some ex-
penditure policies may be necessary to preserve redistributive policies even though this
38 Of course, countrics may impose residency requircments for these benefits, to some degree lessening
the pressures.
h Ilic recent shift from a property tax to a head tax in financing public services in the U.K. could be
imterpreted as a responmsc to this type of presure.
'10 Given that a V.A.T. should roughly correspond to a benefit tax, at least relative to o(her taxes used
at the national ledel, it is ironic that the E:.C. has rocussed its tax courdination efforts on this particular
tax.
l'or discussion of various limitations of the Ticbout argument, see, for example, Stiglitz(1083).
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coordination undennines the ability of each government to provide the composition or
level of public expenditures desired by its citizenry.
At this point, these various pressures will be much more important within the E.C.,
where all restrictions to migration are being eliminated, than in the U.S.-Canadian context.
The pressures are still there, however, and will surely increase over time.
4. Conclusions
When analyzing the fiscal implications of unrestricted mobility among jurisdictions,
the local public finance literature concludes that the fiscal system will be driven towards
a benefit-tax structure, in which people pay in taxes an amount appropriate to cover 
the
costs they impose on the public sector. Yet existing national tax systems in the U.S.
and Canada differ substantially from benefit taxes. As a result, the increasing mobility
of output, capital, and even labor, between the two economies will create a variety of
pressures pushing the tax system towards a benefit-tax structure.
Where this pressure will be strongest depends on the degree of mobility of particular
types of goods, services, and people, across the border. This paper explored in turn the
types of pressures created by mobility of capital, unrestricted trade in all outputs, and
mobility of l)COPlC.
Even though tax competition will push each country's fiscal structure towards that 
of
a benefit tax, however, such a tax system may not be mutually advantageous - in fact,
both countries may well gain through explicit or implicit coordination of fiscal policies. 
In
many cases the appropriate form of coordination involves equalization of tax rates. Where,
for example, the local public finance literature calls for the national government to handle
redlistribution, given the degree to which individual mobility undermines any one coin-
munity's efforts at redistribution, the same logic calls here for coordinating redistributive
policies between the two countries. A number of other examples of fruitful areas for policy
coordination are discussed.
Ultimately, the implications of the increasing interdependence of the two 
economies
on their national fiscal structures should be substantial. Fortunately, the 
two countries
can watch the European experience post-19
9 2 to learn better how to redesign the existing
fiscal systems in the two countries.
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